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SECURING SECURITY
RoBINSON 0. Evwamrr*
Cleaning the Augean stables demanded a Hercules, but his task would seem
child's play to anyone trying to clean up the muddle in the law of secured transac-
tions. Yet the draftsmen of Article 9 of the proposed Commercial Code have tried
to do just that-bring order and simplicity into this field now marked by chaos and
complexity.
Complexity in the law governing security devices stems chiefly from three sources:
(i) lack of uniformity among the states; (2) divided control under the federal
system; and (3) lack of correlation in the law of any particular jurisdiction.
As to the first, each of the forty-eight states has its own concept of how to resolve
the fundamental conflict in goals: Protection of borrowers from overreaching money-
lenders versus protection of creditors from prodigals who, having lived beyond their
means, seek to evade their obligations. Also, each state has its own peculiar com-
bination of pressure groups, groups more active in this than in other areas of com-
mercial law, and all seeking special legislative concessions.
The significance of the consequent interstate legal variations is great under our
credit system in which much of the collateral, as, for example, automobiles, is either
movable or in transit. The increase of financing against accounts receivable, ac-
counts which may have arisen from the assignor's sales to persons located in several
states, gives prominence to differences in state laws for that kind of financing.
And varying state provisions also are important as a hindrance to large finance com-
panies trying to economize by devising standard forms and procedures workable
for any of the states in which they take liens.
In some areas of law, differences in state laws can be handled inter partes by
means of express choice-of-law stipulations. But no such provision in a security
agreement would be effective, since it would not bind creditors who had not con-
sented thereto. Consequently there is special need for uniformity in the law of
security and it seems obvious that universal acceptance of the Code's Article on
Secured Transactions would help meet this need.
Secondly, complexity in secured financing is a consequence of the Federal Gov-
ernment's supremacy in matters of bankruptcy. Since bankruptcy is the crucible in
which security is tested, state law is sensitive to the Bankruptcy Act and its interpre-
tations. This was most recently demonstrated when the Klauder case's construction
of Section 6oa brought forth a welter of state statutes dealing with assignments of
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accounts receivable 2 Similarly, the draftsmen of the Article on Secured Transactions
have had to keep their eyes on the Bankruptcy Act. They have not, however, tried to
tamper with that Act directly; unlike some portions of the Code, Article 9 is not
being proposed for federal adoption?
In one or two respects the Code may be difficult to synthesize with the federal
law. Thus, the Code's negation of the importance of title4 must reckon with
Section 7oa of the Bankruptcy Act, which confers on the trustee in bankruptcy all
the assets to which the bankrupt had "tide." And what will be the effect of bank-
ruptcy on the rights after default given by the codifiers? The right to repossess
without judicial processs, if that can be done without breach of the peace,' might be
held to exist against the trustee. However, the Code goes beyond this broad right
to repossess and permits the secured lender to dispose of the collateral while leaving it
on the debtor's premises.6 If this provision should be construed to mean that the
lender has sole control over realization on collateral even when it is left in the
possession of the trustee in bankruptcy, would not there be something of an innova-
tion? But this question can be better answered elsewhere in the symposium, to-
gether with the general question whether the Code would lessen or increase the com-
plexity of secured transactions properly attributable to our federal system.
The third factor resulting in chaos is the absence of integration and order in the
statutes and decisions covering secured financing in any particular jurisdiction. Pro-
fessor Leary, analyzing the law of Pennsylvania, has emphasized the lack of correla-
tion in its law governing security.1 He points out how there the rights of bona fide
purchasers will vary without apparent reason according to the label a financer selects
for the transaction; and the same unintelligible differences are present in regard to
landlords' liens, fixtures, and methods and places of recording.
Similarly New York has failed to correlate its factor's lien statute with the law
governing mortgages. For instance, a bulk mortgage is subject to elaborate formali-
ties designed to protect creditors against a borrower who intends to give a mortgage
and then make off with the proceeds of the mortgage loan. But apparently these
safeguards can be circumvented by the simple expedient of giving a factor's lien
instead of a mortgage. Also, in authorizing the factor's lien, did New York intend
to apply thereto its traditional mortgage doctrine "that retention of possession by the
mortgagor with power of sale for his own benefit is fraudulent as to creditors?"'
Such examples of the confusion in the law of particular jurisdictions-what I
have termed the third source of chaos in secured financing-could be greatly multi-
2See Pemberton, Notice Filing for Assignments of Accounts Receivable, 13 LAW & CONTEP I. P11o.
643 (948).
'See May 195o Draft of the Code §1-105 (Federal Version). Yet the Comment to Section 9-2o6
speaks of "enactment of this Article by Congress.. .
'See September Revision (hereafter cited as Revision) §9-202.
'Revision §9-503.
'Ibid. Cf. May 195o Draft, §503.
' Leary, Our Uncorrelated Chattel Security Law, 19 PA. BAR AsS'N Q. 295 (1948).
'N. Y. LiEN LAw §23oa.
'See Justice Brandeis' speculation in Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353, 361 n. 11 (1925).
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plied. It is the contribution of the Code towards removing this cause of difficulty in
the law of secured transactions that I propose to discuss. Does the Code afford a
simple, rational, and consistent framework of security that a state can wisely adopt
independent of its universal adoption? And do the changes in current law proposed
by the codifiers really help secure security or do they create new woes as bad as those
we now endure?
I
THE CoDE's SRucTuRE AND APPROACH
Among the chief advantages of the Code are its structure and approach. For
one thing, instead of relying on a priori concepts, the draftsmen sought to probe the
expectations of the business community, an effort facilitated by the length of time
available for preparing the Code. And, having found those expectations, the drafts-
men tried to express them in words that make sense to businessmen (and conse-
quently perhaps make nonsense to attorneys). To the codifiers it seemed that a
financier should be enabled to tell rapidly what his rights .would be under a pro-
jected loan; under current law by the time those rights are ascertained the loan
may well have fallen through.
The effort to obtain clarity and to get out of confusing legalistic ruts caused the
codifiers, at least in Article 9, to adopt an approach which can be given the familiar
tag "functional." This in turn brought the end of today's multiplicity of security
devices and motivated a direction: "This Article applies regardless of the form of
the transaction.... ."" The lender can use terms like bailment lease, conditional sale,
and chattel mortgage to his heart's content; but under the Code there would be only
two security devices-a general lien and a purchase money interest to secure en-
abling advances-supplemented by some special rules for different types of collateral. 1'
No room was left for that cherished legal concept "title," so that "each provision ...
applies without regard to who has title to the collateral."' 2
The approach of the codifiers also emphasizes self-operating procedures whereby
parties can settle their differences with little reference to a court. For example,
under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act it is provided that fixtures can be severed
if there is no "material injury" to the realty to which they are attached.'3 Such
injury requires not only the determination of specific facts but also the application
of a difficult standard-materiality. Moreover, it seems harsh that if the injury is
immaterial, the owner of the realty gets no recompense for such injury as there is,
while, if the injury is material, the chattel financier loses all rights in his security re-
gardless of its value in relation to the amount of injury from removal. In 1935
Pennsylvania amended its Conditional Sales Act to provide that personalty can be
"0 Revision §9-1o2(2).
'
1 The Comment to Section 9-io2 of the May 195o Draft of the Code has a table of provisions
applicable to special types of collateral.
1" Revision §9-2o2.
8 UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALEs Act §7-
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removed irrespective of damage to realty if a bond is given for damages.' 4 The Code,
too, gives an absolute right to remove -collateral attached to the land if a bond is
given for the cost of repairs to the realty, though not for diminution in the value
of the land due to the removal. 5 Under this provision-together with the Code's
.general favor for the self-operating procedure of "cover"L--instead of dispute as to
the materiality of the prospective injury, the only issue, the cost of repairs, can be
easily settled by the owner's having the repairs made and submitting the bill to the
court.
Clarity and certainty require a liberal sprinkling of hard-and-fast rules. The
courts, however, are reluctant to hand down such rules and usually rely on juries to
determine whether in a particular case a period of time or form of notice has been
"reasonable." In some areas trade associations take up the slack and promulgate a
system of private law under which the generality of a standard set by statute or ju-
dicial decision is filled in in terms of the conditions in the particular industry. But se-
cured transactions involve the rights of many not subject to the "law-making" of trade
or other organizations-persons who, not being parties to the loan agreement, cannot
be bound by its clauses. Accordingly, if the needed cut-and-dried rules are to be filled
in, it must be by statute. One of the most troitblesome litigable questions as to
debtors' estates is "tracing"; many an estate has been dissipated in fighting out the
factual issues incident to tracing the proceeds of goods subject to a lien. To lessen
this problem-and taking a leaf from the Uniform Trust Receipts Actl-the Code
provides a specific rule:
In insolvency proceedings a lender with a perfected security interest has a right to the
cash and checking accounts of the debtor equal to the amount of cash proceeds received
by the debtor within ten days prior to the institution of such proceedings but no other right
to or lien on cash proceeds not subjected to his control before insolvency proceedings are
instituted.18
Problems of "tracing" might have arisen under the provisions of the Code giving
special rights to a "purchase money security interest." Disputes would have been
inevitable as to whether a loan was actually used to pay the purchase price or merely
went into the borrower's checking account, while he pulled cash out of his safe to
pay the seller. To bypass such bickering the codifiers wisely drafted a conclusive
presumption that if the advances were received ten days before or after the purchase
they were in fact an enabling advance creating a purchase money lien.19 However,
some reward is given to the purchase money financier who makes sure that his
loan is actually used to pay for the goods, since in a contest between two purchase
money interests in the same goods, he will have priority."
"
4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §404 (Supp. 1949). "5 Revision §9-314(2).
"' For instance, Section 2-712 of the May 195o Draft permits "cover" as a remedy if a seller fails
to perform.
"'Section io(b) (but the right to ten days' proceeds is in addition to, rather than in lieu of, the
right to trace).
8 Revision §9-3o6(2). Revision §9-1o7.
" Revision §9-313(4).
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Another instance of the attempt to remove litigable issues and make the outcome
certain is the provision that a lien "continues perfected for a period of four months"
if property is brought into another state.2 This replaces the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act's requirement that refiling occur "within ten days after the seller has
received notice of the filing district to which the goods have been removed. 22 Thus
refiling is made independent of the troublesome question of notice, and there is no
longer the anomaly of giving a financier superior rights because he was so careless
he never knew his collateral had been taken into another state.
In seeking to bring new order to security, the codifiers have sought to retain only
distinctions that are meaningful. Among the most meaningful of distinctions is that
drawn between normal commercial financing and the financing of consumer goods
transactions-such goods being those "used primarily for personal, family or house-
hold purposes."23 This dichotomy conforms to the Codes basic differentiation
of transactions between professionals from those in which non-professionals are
involved?4 Moreover, it implicitly acknowledges that consumer financiers are often
guilty of "repossession-thinking," the lender seeking to derive unfair profits from
fees or forfeitures obtained through repossession. Indeed, the original popularity of
the conditional sale is attributed by some to its utility in promoting forfeitures in
consumer installment sales. And Maryland, in its statute regulating retail installment
sales, found it necessary to prohibit one subtle practice designed to promote consumer
defaults and resulting repossessions-the use of a "balloon obligation" under which
the unsophisticated buyer is misled by a series of small installments only to be
confronted with an unexpectedly large final installment.?5
By providing special rules for consumer financing, the Code averts some of the
difficulties under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. The draftsman of that Act,
conscious of the abuses associated with the conditional sale in consumer transactions,
failed to consider how frequently the conditional sale is used in non-consumer
financing; consequently he indiscriminately applied to commercial transactions the
safeguards designed to protect retail buyers. The almost-immediate public auctions
required by the Act to protect consumers from "rigged" sales wreaked havoc in
the context of commercial financing. By preventing the disposition of repossessed
collateral in a way that would produce maximum realization on intrinsic value, the
Act led to large deficiency judgments against non-consumer debtors.
While the Code segregates consumer transactions, it does not go in for the detailed
regulation which characterizes the state statutes. 6 No agency or licensing is pro-
vided for; there is no outlawing of clauses confessing judgment, waiving tort claims
for improper repossessions, assigning wages, or authorizing repossession whenever
"zRevision §9-1o3(2).
"Section 14.
"Revision §9-zog(x).
"Cf. the Comment to Section 2-104 of the May 195o Draft.
"MD. ANss. CoDE GEN. LAws art. 83, §i18(c) (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"For a detailed report of developments in state regulation of retail installment sales, see Note, 63
H.v. L. Rav. 874 (rg5o).
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the financier feels jittery. Moreover, Secured Transactions are not subject to the
same standard of unconscionability the Code applies to Sales 27  Presumably this
abstention stems from a desire to avoid controversy that might imperil the Code's
passage. And perhaps there is a fear that uncertainty would result under an author-
ity to strike out "unconscionable" clauses, since many judges would probably give
"bull-in-a-china-shop" treatment to the clauses of a standard loan agreement.
II
CODE CHANGES IN CURRENT LAw
A. Pledge and Equitable Pledge
Granddaddy of all methods of secured financing is the pledge, in which possession
of the collateral is given the lender. Since he holds the collateral the financier is
protected against possible dishonesty on the borrower's part. As to the other risk
customarily facing a lender, that of the borrower's insolvency, he is also protected,
for his possession has given other creditors notice not to rely on the borrower's
ownership of the pledged assets and thereby has removed the stigma of a "secret
lien." Moreover, if possession is taken concurrently with the loan, it evidences that
the transaction was not originally intended to be an unsecured loan with the lender
trying to grab a preference as he sees his debtor becoming shaky.
As a basic policy, the Code states that possession of a lender "does not include
possession by the debtor even though acting on behalf of the lender.""8 Thus it
seeks to preclude formalistic procedures under which goods might be "pledged" and
almost immediately redelivered to the "pledgor" as agent for the lender-pledgee.
However, Section 9-304 creates an exception to this rule, and permits a lender who
has possession of instruments, documents, or chattel paper to turn over the collateral
and nevertheless retain a perfected lien for twenty-one days. The Uniform Trust
Receipts Act similarly gave a period of grace, ten days, in which, despite redelivery of
pledged collateral, the lender held a lien valid against creditors 9 But the Trust
Receipts Act extended this protection to the redelivery of goods and stated a require-
ment that redelivery be "for a temporary and limited purpose." Presumably the
codifiers omitted this last limitation because they thought it would lead to litigation,
and would probably be superfluous since the redelivery of the instruments or docu-
ments would normally only be for a limited purpose, like the collection of chattel
paper or a "day loan" of securities to a broker.
An outgrowth of the pledge is the "equitable pledge," in which possession is not
taken concurrently with the loan but the lender is given authority to take possession
later if he so desires. The equitable pledge would include the familiar clause in
loan agreements whereby the financier reserves the right to demand more collateral
if he feels insecure. And building contracts frequently contain equitable pledges
May 195o Draft §2-32.
"Revision §9-Ixo (2).
'Sec. 3(3)-
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under which, in case of default on the contractor's part, either owner or surety. is
given a right to take possession of his materials and equipment in order to finish the
job.
In the absence of statute, the after-acquired property clause in a mortgage of
inventory also is usually viewed as creating an equitable pledge, under which the
mortgagee is entitled to protect his claim of lien by taking possession of the after-
acquisitions;30 and the borrower cannot revoke his assent to the mortgagee's entering
into possession of the collateral. If the lender is able to take possession of the
property before any creditor can attach, he obtains a prior lien. But this lien seems
extremely vulnerable, for under Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act-both before and
after its amendment in March i95o-the taking of possession after the pledge will
not "relate back" to the original pledge agreement and so will be a "transfer for or
on account of an antecedent debt."
Despite the ostensible abandonment of "relation back," the doctrine still has
some vitality under the Code. For example, the codifiers have authorized an
equitable pledge of documents, instruments, and chattel paper effective for twenty-
one days 1 This differs from the equitable pledge provided by the Trust Receipts
Act in respect to period of grace without filing and to not covering goods! 2 Also,
the codifiers seek partially to sidestep Section 6oa by providing that an interest in
after-acquired property "is not security for a pre-existing debt or claim" if (a) the
interest is claimed by a secured lender and (b) the acquisitions are either in pur-
suance of the loan agreement or in ordinary course of business3 These two re-
strictions make the Code's provision chiefly applicable to revolving indebtedness
agreements which, for most practical purposes, are the same as arrangements under
which the goods subject to the lien are sold, the proceeds turned over to the lender,
and new advances made almost at once against goods coming in to replenish
inventory. Consequently, there can be no charge that the codifiers have called black
white, called old value new, in order to defeat the Bankruptcy Act's policy against
preferences.
Probably the equitable pledge would suffer a decline under the Code. Much of
its current use reflects an attempt to cope with those cases stating that property
cannot be mortaged in futuro, and to escape expensive formalities required for a
valid mortgage. Since the Code affirms that "except as otherwise provided by law a
security agreement is effective according to its terms ... ,,,4 apparently a loan agree-
ment could provide that a lien arise in the future and upon any prescribed con-
tingencies. Instead of having an insecurity clause under which the lender may de-
mand that additional collateral be turned over to him, why not incorporate in the loan
agreement provisions for a lien to arise automatically under certain conditions and
without need to take possession of the additional collateral? Certainly the expenses
Rights under an after-acquired property clause are discussed in Note, 28 ORE. L. REv. 376 (1949)-
a Revision S9-304(3). 8Sec. 3(l).
R evision 59-1o8(2). , Revision §9-201.
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and formalities of filing a financial statement under the Code would not be great
enough to constitute a serious obstacle to this procedure.
B. Field Warehousing
Field warehousing is really only another form of pledge-warehouse receipts being
pledged instead of the goods!" Frequently the warehousing is rather artificial.
The warehouseman may be a corporation organized solely to facilitate the particular
loan; the employees of the warehouseman may be employees of the borrower who
have been bonded in connection with the warehousing operation; the only goods the
warehouseman will receive will be those of the borrower; and the "warehouse" is
merely a segregated area of the borrower's plant. The whole point of this involved
set up is to permit advances against collateral which the borrower must have accessible
in order to carry on his operations and which, because it is changing form due to
processing, cannot be handled in many jurisdictions under other types of security
arrangements. Also, field warehousing permits the property in the warehouse to be
repossessed and sold by the lender without reference to a bankruptcy court. And
recordation and acknowledgment of the lien are unnecessary.
Already field warehousing seems to be in eclipse, 8 presumably due to its high
cost and, in my opinion, to the increasing availability of factor's liens which can
frequently play the role for which field warehousing was designed. Under the Code
there would be even less reason to use it. Since the codifiers treat warehouse receipts
in conjunction with field warehousing as creating a nonpossessory security interest,
filing is required;" nor does the pledgee of the receipts have superior rights in case
of default. Also, the Code's provision for a general lien, which can attach to after-
acquired property and follow the collateral as it is processed, undercuts the need
for field warehousing. Probably if the Code is enacted, field warehousing will be
resorted to only if the lender thinks his loan is especially risky and wishes to police
the borrower by having his own representative as "warehouseman" on the borrower's
premises and in possession of the collateral.
C. Purchase Money Mortgages, Conditional Sales, and Trust Receipts
Almost as ancient as the pledge is the chattel mortgage in which, instead of
possession, the lender relies on recordation to give notice of the existence of his
lien. Next on the scene was the conditional sale, whose raison d'tre apparently
was its freedom from the controls equity had placed on the chattel mortgage.
Originally the conditional sale was the rival of the purchase money mortgage; today,
after transformation by statutes, it looks in many states more and more like the
twin. For instance, North Carolina provides that conditional sales are to be
"registered in the same manner, for the same fees, and with the same legal effect as
"'Legal aspects of field warehousing are examined in Birnbaum, Form and Substance in Field Ware-
houdng, 13 LAW & CoNrEmp. PRo. 579 (1948).
"' See Koch, Economic Aspects of Inventory and Receivables Financing, 13 LAw & CONTEmp. Pion.
566, 572 (1948).
8
"Revision §9"3o5(2).
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is provided for chattel mortgages."3' And Texas states more bluntly that conditional
sales contracts "shall be held to be chattel mortgages."39 Illinois is one of the few
states in which the conditional sale retains its common law vigor3°
In line with the tendency for conditional sales to become indistinguishable from
purchase money mortgages, the codifiers wisely have swallowed up both in the
"purchase money security interest." This new security interest responds to the
function the parties intended the loan to play-an enabling advance for the purchase
of goods. Also, it disregards what Judge Hand, dissenting in In re Lake's Laundry,
termed the "barren distinction, though indubitably true, that tide does not pass
upon a conditional sale.""' That same case held that while both mortgagee and
conditional vendee were "creditors" for bankruptcy purposes under Section 77B of
the Bankruptcy Act-and presumably under Chapter X-the conditional seller
does not have to enter the reorganization and may repossess his collateral because
the borrower never got "tide." Other cases have utilized this "barren distinction" in
deciding that conditional sellers are not subject to the after-acquired property clause
in a prior lien given by the conditional vendee, but that a seller who takes a pur-
chase money mortgage is subordinate to the earlier liene. 42 Anyone who distrusts
"conceptualism" and to whom the emphasis on "tide" is anathema will shed few
tears that the Code leaves no place for decisions like these.
The trust receipt is something of a Johnny-come-lately among security devices,
gaining most of its popularity in the last thirty years. It is the converse of the condi-
tional sale in that no seller can use it; but, like the conditional sale, the trust receipt
at common law depended for its validity on a finding as to the location of tide.
Thus, numerous cases enunciate the requirement that tide move directly from the
seller to the third party financier; if there was the slightest slip and-however in-
stantaneously-tide went to the buyer, the transaction was considered a disguised
chattel mortgage demanding the orthodox foreclosure formalities, and was usually
held invalid for lack of recordation.4" Under the Code all these common law sub-
deties are forgotten and the trust receipt, too, is lumped in the purchase money se-
curity interest.
Indeed, the handling of the trust receipt in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act and
the theory of new value and enabling advances introduced in that Act served as a
model in framing the Code's purchase money security interest. In the May 1949
draft of the Code there was even a tendency to overparticularize in terms of the
patterns of trust receipts financing; that draft required that, for a purchase money
'
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §47-23 (1943).
Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5489 (194).
"See, e.g., Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long, 318 Ill. 432, 149 N. E. 225 (1925).
&1 79 F. 2d 326, 328 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 622 (1935).
"
2 E.g., Diana Paper Co. v. Wheeler-Green Electric Co., 228 App. Div. 577, 24o N. Y. Supp. io8
(4th Dep't 1930).
"E.g., McLeod Nash Motors v. Commercial Credit Trust, 187 Minn. 452, 246 N. W. ]7 (932);
Armstrong v. Greenwich Motors Corp., x16 Conn. 487, 165 At. 598 (1933); In re Schuttig, I F. 2d
443 (D. N. J. 1924).
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interest, each unit of inventory be identified and a release price be provided for the
discharge of that portion of the obligation secured by each unit."4 As implied in the
official comment for the draft, this requirement conformed to the practice of itemiza-
tion and setting forth release price per unit in the trust receipting of automobiles and
other durable goods. But the requirement was a straitjacket. Itemization would
have been too expensive for goods of low unit cost and without unit serial numbers;
it would have been impractical where the goods were sold by measure rather than by
unit. Accordingly, this provision was deleted, since the purchase money security
interest was not designed solely for high cost durable goods but for any transaction
in which new value is advanced for the purchase of goods.
D. Factor's Liens
In recent years over twenty states have adopted factor's lien statutes, for the most
part modeled on the New York law."5 In these statutes "factor" no longer means
a middleman engaged in marketing but is a word of art denoting any persons "who
advance money on goods consigned to and/or pledged with them.""' Probably the
phrase "advance . . . on" would be held to imply that the factor must make an
advance concurrently with the taking of the lien, so that the factor's lien could not
be used to create a preference in favor of a previously unsecured creditor.
In addition to being apparently restricted to new value transactions, the factor's
lien is sometimes subjected to restrictions on the type of goods it can cover. For
example, Maryland permits it for "merchandise," which it defines as "any personal
property intended for sale" but not including "fixtures or other trade or manu-
facturing equipment" ;4T under this statute it would seem that raw materials or
goods in process could not be factored. Missouri, on the other hand, equates "mer-
chandise" with "chattels intended for sale in the same or a different form," and adds
that the borrower need not be engaged in manufacturing. 8 In Virginia and West
Virginia seemingly only manufacturers can be financed by factor's liens; 4 in
Michigan and North Carolina only manufacturers and processors.Y° Texas states
that a factor's lien "shall not apply to any stock of goods, wares or merchandise daily
exposed to sale at retail in the regular course of business."'51
The Code takes the "continuing general lien" provided by factor's lien laws as
the model for its own general lien. But such a lien can be given to secure an ante-
cedent debt-though, of course, subject to the Bulk Transfer Article-and any kind
of goods can be covered. The codifiers also dispense with the "conspicuous signs"
that some statutes require to be maintained on the premises where the goods are
4 Sec. 7-302.
"A table of the provisions of these statutes appears in Silverman, Factoring: Its Legal 1spects and
Economic Justification, 13 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 593, 602-603 (948).
" See, e.g., N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAw §45.
"MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAw art. 2, §23-28 (Cure. Supp. 1947).
"Mo. Laws 1945, S. B. 75 (6).
NIV. VA. CoDE ANN. §3946(17) (949); VA. CODE §55-143 (1950).
"Mich. Laws 1947, P. S. i8o; N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §44-70 (Supp. 1949).
"Tx. RFv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 55o6(c)(so) (Supp. 1949).
SECURING SECURIT
located; and they fill in the gap appearing in several statutes as to whether a lien
attaches to the proceeds arising from the sale of factored goods. Moreover, the Code
carefully delineates the rights of the lender upon default; these are usually ignored
in the statutes dealing with factor's liens, Minnesota and Vermont apparently being
unique in providing that the factor's lien may be foreclosed or redemption made in
the same manner as for chattel mortgages.0 Viewed generally, the Code seems
to reflect more careful draftsmanship than any of the factor's lien laws.
E. Accounts Receivable
In addition to inventory and equipment, most manufacturers and merchants
have another asset, their receivables. These receivables can arise on open account or
can represent obligations secured by conditional sales or chattel mortgages. In the
latter case delivery of the security agreement customarily accompanies the transfer
of the receivable; and, deferring to this business custom, several states53 and the
draftsmen of the new Code have set up special rules for assigning this "chattel
paper."54 But whether chattel paper or open account, his receivables are frequently
a businessman's most liquid asset, one against which he often seeks to obtain cash.
Originally in the Code, financing against this asset was assimilated to inventory
financing, an "inventory lien" being provided for both tangibles and receivables.
The rationale of this assimilation was the opinion that in the minds of the business
community receivables merge with inventory in a fundamental "working assets"
concept. However, while receivables resemble inventory in constituting quick assets,
the codifiers found that in many respects receivables financing raises distinct problems
requiring separate treatment. For one thing unlike other loan arrangements the
assignment of receivables is interpreted in some business circles as being almost a
confession of insolvency. Consequently many a borrower would feel reluctance
even to finance against his receivables, much less to have on public record a notice
that he is doing so.
The intangibility of accounts in itself raises different problems. It opens up
vistas of fraud-fake invoices, duplicate assignments, improper collections by the
assignor, trumped-up accounts, and the like-and demands a larger amount of
policing than would be necessary for normal inventory financing. And where are
the receivables located for purposes of perfecting the assignment? For chattel paper
common sense would dictate that the location of the "paper" determine the applicable
law. For other receivables traditional doctrine, at least, would refer to the place
where the account arose or where payment is to be made. But these contacts may
well be so diversified or so fortuitous as to be unserviceable. Another possibility
would center on the assignor's place of business, where it is argued his creditors will
"MINN. STAT. ANN. §514.86 (Supp. 1949); VT. SAT. §2746 (1947). Note, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1i9
(195o) discusses the Minnesota Factor's Lien Law.
53E.g., CAL. Cxv. CODF §955 (1949); N. J. STAT. ANx. §17: 16B-6(d) (Supp. 1949).
' For instance, an assignment of chattel paper can be perfected by delivery without filing. See
Revision S§9-io5(b)-9-3o2(b), 9-308.
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be most likely to search the record for assignments. The Code, refining this latter
approach to take account of the case where the assignor has branches in several
states, provides: "For the purposes of this Article (a) accounts or contracts rights are
located in this state if the office of the assignor where he keeps his records of the
accounts or contract rights is located in this state... ." Thus, in the normal situa-
tion filing will only have to be done in a single state which can be easily determined
on the basis of a test understandable to any businessman.
Unlike inventory financing, receivables financing involves someone other than
the borrower or lender-the account debtor; this can create difficulties. In the first
place, the value of the accounts assigned depends on the credit of the assignor's
customers; to evaluate that credit requires careful investigation, which adds to the
cost of receivables financing and discourages some financiers from entering the
field. Also, the attitudes of these customers may be important. If notification of
the assignment is given the customers, will they know whom to pay? Will they
misinterpret the assignment as a mark of the seller's financial desperation? If
the payments are to be made at the assignee's place of business, will the assignor be
losing a merchandising opportunity because his customers do not have to come to
his store to make their payments?
One of the. chief problems of receivables financing concerns realization on the
collateral, and arises from the rights of the account debtor. At first glance the
position of the assignee of accounts would seem to be excellent in regard to realiza-
tion. He does not have to worry about storing or selling repossessed goods. He
must only avoid improper dunning of the debtor and decide when to compromise
claims. But there is one snag-the possibility that the value of the receivables may
be diminished due to claims arising from the underlying transaction which created
the account. The risk is not inconsiderable, for a seller about to default on his
obligations may try to save some money by cutting corners on his goods, and may
thereby give rise to claims of fraud or breach of warranty. Also, the assignor's de-
fault will frequently coincide with a falling market in his industry, and this in turn
may lead buyers to give goods unusually close scrutiny in the hope of finding a mi-
nute nonconformity on the basis of which they can reject or rescind.
Under present law the financer can to some extent segregate himself from the
original sales transaction. If a mortgage and note are used by the seller and then
assigned to the lender, defenses are cut off on the note and under the traditional
rule that a note "imparts negotiability" to the mortgage securing it, the financier can
even repossess without regard to the buyer's equities. The chief deterrent is the
possibility that the relation of the seller and the finance company will seem so inti-
mate as to persuade judge or jury that the financier is not a holder in due course.
If instead of a mortgage a conditional sale is used, the seller may seek to procure
assignability free of defenses by: (i) contemporaneous execution of a promissory
note; (2) the drafting of the contract itself as a promissory note; or (3) the in-
"sRevision §9"103(1).
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sertion of a "cut-off clause" in the conditional sales contract.56 Under either the
first or second technique, negotiability is not imparted to the security. A recent
New York decision dealt with the third and indicated that while a cut-off clause
might be effective to waive a breach of warranty, it did not suffice to create an estoppel
to defend on the ground of fraud.
5 7
Efforts to cut off the defenses of account debtors have received several statutory
rebuffs. Illinois provides, "All notes secured by chattel mortgages shall state upon
their face that they are secured," or the mortgage shall be void; and secured notes
are made non-negotiable.5 Maryland protects its consumers from the hardships
of negotiability by requiring in its Retail Installment Sales Act that a note in con-
nection with an installment sale shall refer thereto,5 and be subject to all defenses,
while Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act states:
No installment sale contract shall require or entail the execution of any note or series
of notes by the buyer which, when separately negotiated, will cut off as to third parties
any right of action or defense which the buyer may have against the original seller.60
For consumers' sales the Code also accepts the policy of not permitting negoti-
ability. But there is an exception in cases where a negotiable instrument, given as
part of the transaction and not referring to the security, agreement, is negotiated to a
holder in due course who seeks to proceed solely on the instrument and not to en-
force the security agreement."' This concession to negotiability may seem wise; yet
to lessen possible harsh effects on consumers, would it not be desirable to require,
subject to penalty, that a negotiable instrument in a consumer sale refer to any
security agreement?
For non-consumer secured transactions, the Code gives full effect to "cut-off
clauses."62 The argument in favor of allowing negotiability by contract is analogous
to that for making the issuer of a letter of credit independent of defenses or counter-
claims arising out of the underlying sales transactions. According to this argument,
a financier against accounts receivable lacks the expertise for determining whether
the goods conform to the minute specifications of the sales contracts from which the
accounts arose; and under the Code, unless they conform in every particular, they
can be rejected.03 Therefore the financier can lend against receivables at reasonable
rates only if he is free from all concern with the initial sale. Irrespective of accept-
ance of this argument, it seems desirable that the law as to conditional sales and
purchase money mortgages should be sufficiently harmonized so that if defenses can
" See Note, 57 YALE L. J. i414 (1948).
"Manhattan Co. v. Monogram Associates, Inc., 276 App. Div. 766, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 579 (2d Dep't
'949).
" ILL. STAT. ANN. §83.35 (1935).
SMD. ANt. CoDE GEN. LAws art. 83, §134 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"
0 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §615 (G) (Supp. 1949).
"1 Revision §9-2o8(z).
" Revision §9-208(2).
"May i95o Draft §2-6oi.
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be cut-off under one, they can equally be cut-off under the other, and vice versa.
The Code does remove any distinction.
III
SoM INNOVATIONS UNDER TIM CODE
A. After-Acquired Property
One of the chief purposes of the codifiers in the Article on Secured Transactions
was to authorize a "floating charge" like that used by English financiers. In its
most usual form such a charge is part of an agreement to keep outstanding a loan
which will represent a certain proportion of the borrower's inventory. As items
are acquired, processed, and later sold, the charge covers them at all times while
they are in the borrower's hands, even though no pledge or mortgage is entered into
subsequent to the original loan agreement.
Perhaps the closest thing to the "floating charge" in American law is the factor's
lien. But under most factor's lien statutes there is a question whether after-acquired
property must be formally pledged or consigned. Rhode Island and South Carolina
seem explicity to require these evidentiary formalities, for they speak of the factor's
lien as covering goods described "from time to time in written statements identifying
such merchandise."" New York in its statute refers to a general lien "upon all
goods and merchandise from time to time consigned to or pledged with" the factor.'
In states where factor's liens are not permitted, after-acquired property can be covered
fairly well by an arrangement under which the borrower executes new mortgages
or trust receipts as inventory comes in to replace what has been sold; or if "field
warehousing" is being used, the warehouse receipts are pledged as the goods are
acquired and turned over to the warehouse.
The Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act also attempted to establish "floating charges,"
but the Act was not adopted in full by any state. 0 However, several states have
followed the Chattel Mortgage Act in providing that after-acquired property can,
under some circumstances, be covered by a mortgage. Georgia permits a mortgage
or bill of sale to cover a stock of goods, or inventory of merchandise (which includes
materials, goods in process, and finished goods) "or other things in bulk but changing
in specifics"; the lien is lost as to all articles disposed of but attaches to purchases
made to take their place, and when expressly so stipulated in the mortgage, to other
after-acquired additions to the original stock."1 Kentucky lets the chattel mortgage
"include replacements of any mortgaged property therein described.""8 Maine pro-
vides: "A chattel mortgage shall constitute a valid lien on property described in the
mortgage to be purchased with the proceeds of the loan secured thereby, and on
"' R. I. Public Laws 1938, c. 2568(1); S. C. CODE ANN. §8785 (1942).65N. Y. PERs. PRop. Law §45. In re Comet Textile Co., 15 F. Supp. 963 (S. D. N. Y. 1936), a/J'd,
91 F. 2d ioo8 (2d Cir. 1937) held that periodic pledges were not required by the statute.
:6 See Draftsman's Note to Section 17 of that Act.
6' GA. CoDE ANN. §67-103 (Supp. 1947).
8 Ky. R)V. STAT. §382-6xo (1948). Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. §51-505 (Supp. 1949) ("Replacements").
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substitutions for or replacements of property described in the mortgage, when ac-
quired by the mortgagor."' Mississippi authorizes an after-acquired property
clause, but not for merchandise.7" Louisiana permits a mortgage of movables and
certain "masses or assemblages," which include "stocks of inventoried merchandise
or other things in bulk, but changing in specifics"; as to this inventory, the lien shifts
from items sold to things replacing them and to after-acquired inventory.71  Cali-
fornia has a strange conglomeration of statutes. According to one:
Title acquired by the mortgagor subsequent to the execution of the mortgage inures
to the mortgagee as security for the debt in like manner as if acquired before the execu-
tion.72
It seems likely, however, that this provision was not intended to authorize the use of
after-acquired property clauses, but merely to deal with an estoppel by deed situa-
tion where the mortgagor's title, defective at the time of executing the mortgage, was
later perfected by him. This interpretation is reenforced by the existence of a differ-
ent section of the California Civil Code, which seems more applicable to after-
acquired property clauses, and states:
An agreement may be made to create a lien upon property not yet acquired by the
party agreeing to give the lien, or not yet in existence.73
Even though these two sections have been construed together to authorize after-
acquired property clauses in a mortgage, 4 their significance is diminished by Cali-
fornia's prohibition of mortgages upon "the stock in trade of a merchant. '75
Statutes like these reflect the businessman's viewpoint toward inventory. He
knows his inventory is changing as to individual items; yet he thinks of it as a unit.
Indeed, the notion that to some extent inventory has a constancy which makes it
resemble a fixed asset underlies the accountant's theory of a "base stock" inventory.
Since they view their inventory as an unchanging whole-though with changing
parts-most businessmen feel that the law is unduly complicated when it requires
that, in a loan against inventory, a series of new pledges or mortgages be executed
as new goods stream in to replace old. In the businessman's mind, the collateral
has never really changed.
"ME. REV. STAT. C. 164, §9 (1944). CI. CoNN. REv. GEN. STAT. §7278 (949). (After-acquired
property clause validated as to machinery of a "manufacturing or mechanical establishment" as to "any
after-acquired property forming a part of the establishment" or any substitutions "of like nature to the
property included in such mortgage.")
"0 Miss. Cone ANN. §851 (1942). (Mortgage "on all the chattels of a named class or classes (not
including merchandise) (described or limited as to locality) owned at the time of the execution of the
instrument and on such property of like kind as may be acquired during a stated period not to exceed
twelve months .. ." shall be a valid lien.) Cf. DEL. REv. CODE §3371(c) (1935) (chattels "of the same
class"). New Jersey authorizes after-acquired property clauses to the extent of excusing recordation of
individual mortgages if there is filing of a preliminary statement. N. J. REv. STAT. §46: 28-5.1 (1933).
Cf. N. Y. LIEN LAW §23o-(c) (chattel mortgages by auto dealers).
"LA. GaN. STAT. §5022.1 (Cum. Supp. 1949).
"a CAL. CIV. CODE §2930 (1949).
'
5 1d. § 2883.
" Bank of California v. McCoy, 69 P. 2d 1013 (1937), rev'd on other grounds, 72 P. 2d 923 (1937);
Mason v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 7i F. 2d 246 (9 th Cir. 1934).
"
5 CAL. CIV. CODE §2955 (a949).
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The Code takes the same approach and protects after-acquired property clauses
that will embrace collateral "acquired under a contract of purchase made within a
reasonable time after the making of the security agreement and pursuant thereto,"
or "acquired by the debtor in ordinary course."" A series of pledges or mortgages-
irrespective of the recording of such mortgages-are not required in order to have
the security interest cover incoming goods; though they tend to identify the goods
constituting the collateral, such mortgages or pledges would be an overly expensive
formality. Also, unlike some of the statutes, the Code has no implied or expressed
condition that the new goods be replacements of or substitutions for collateral which
has been disposed of. Such a condition, while theoretically justified, might produce
too much litigation as to what is a "replacement." Accordingly under the Code
most financiers would include in their loan agreement some catch-all clause to the
effect that: "Financier's lien shall extend to all property hereafter acquired by the
debtor."
One change should be noted in the September Revision of the Code. Formerly,
in fixing priorities among conflicting security interests, the codifiers provided that
an interest attaching after a financing statement has been filed takes priority from the
time of its filing.77
This provision is now omitted and it is stated
a secured lender who has a perfected security interest and who acquires rights in after-
acquired collateral under a term in the security agreement takes priority as to such rights
from the time when his security interest was originally perfected ...s
A security interest is perfected when "it attaches if filing is required and filing occurs
before the security interest attaches. ' 79 However, a security interest cannot attach
until "value is given and the debtor has rights in the collateral. 's
Taken together, these provisions seem to indicate that, despite having filed a
financing statement, a lender can lose his priority unless he gives "value" before
another financier both files and gives value. While "value" includes "an considera-
tion sufficient to support a simple contract,"'" would not most courts construe "value
is given" to mean not the promise to loan but the actual advancing of funds? After
all, it was not the promise but the loan that the borrower bargained for. Another
ambiguous situation is involved if lenders A and B both advance money solely on the
security of goods to be acquired later. If either or both are purchase money security
interests, their priorities are provided for." But if neither is a purchase money
interest-perhaps because the advance was made more than io days before acquisition
of the property and because other funds were used for such acquisition-apparently
the security will be prorated. The interest of each was "originally perfected" at the
"
8 Revision §9-io8(2). "'May x95o Draft §9-312(1).
" 'Revision §9-313(1). " Revision §9-303(l) (b).
8
oRevision §9-203(1). 8 Revision §9-io8(i)(6).
82 Revision §9-313(3) (4).
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time the after-acquired goods came into the debtor's hands. There is nothing to
indicate any priority between them. In view of the two situations discussed, I feel
it would be wise to restore the provision under which priority is to be determined
by time of filing, save for purchase money liens.
The Code's leniency towards after-acquired property clauses creates a danger of
overreaching by the lender. It was a similar danger that induced the North Dakota
legislature to provide:
Any mortgage of personal property containing a printed or a written description
or designation of property such as "all other property owned by the mortgagor" or
language of like effect as a part of the printed or written form shall be void and of no
effect as to the property covered by such language.8 3
The Code does at least have two limitations that lessen the possibility of borrowers'
reducing themselves to virtual peonage by giving a security interest in all their
subsequent acquisitions or work products. s4  Consumer goods do not come within
the scope of the after-acquired property clause unless obtained "within ten days after
the secured lender gives value." Similarly no security interest attaches to crops
planted or grown more than one year after the loan agreement is made, unless the
interest is given in conjunction with a lease or land-purchase contract, in which case
the use of the land would seem to be new value, being extended concurrently with
the attaching of the lien.
In permitting an automatic lien on after-acquired property, the Code presents a
possibility that one lender will get a stranglehold on the borrower. For example,
assume that in connection with a loan lender A files a notice of financing which
purports to cover after-acquired property. Later B, contemplating a loan to the
borrower, sees A's notice on record. He cannot be sure whether the collateral he
plans to loan against is covered by A's notice, which having already been filed,
would give priority over any loan under a notice of financing now filed by B. B
will scarcely wish to take a second lien when A would have sole control as to realiza-
tion on the collateral. The upshot of all this is that B may decide against the planned
transaction; and if he does, A, shielded from competition, can extort higher interest
from the borrower.
Several provisions of the Code seek to eliminate the possibility of a monopoly
produced by use of the after-acquired property clause. For one thing, the borrower
can obtain a statement of termination of financing to cancel the effect of obsolete
notices of financing that might otherwise be a cloud over projected loans.85 Also,
by reason of the priority given a purchase money financier over a lien under an
after-acquired property clause, a borrower may be able to obtain enabling advances
from other than the original lender. But the prospective purchase money financier
faces several problems. If inventory is to be the collateral, this financier must give
" N. D. REv. CoDE §35-0402 (i943).
" Revision §9-203(3).
" Revision §9-405.
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notice to any lender who has made a prior filing, the notice to "describe the inven-
tory."s Since such notification must be given before the debtor receives the collateral,
in many instances it may be difficult to give much of a description. Whether the
financier obtains priority will probably depend on how broadly the courts construe
the Code's provision that any description is sufficient "whether or not it is specific
if it reasonably identifies the thing described.""7
If the goods subject to a purchase money security interest are processed or sold,
will the lien on the finished product or on the proceeds take the same priority as
the lien on the raw goods? Formerly the Code's definition of the "purchase money
security interest" spoke of an interest which originally was taken to secure an en-
abling advance8 ' The omission of "originally" in the September Revision may indi-
cate an intent to confine the priority to the collateral in the condition in which it
entered the borrower's hands. Also, if there are two purchase money security inter-
ests, can the equity in one be applied to secure the other? For instance, suppose the
lender makes two enabling advances, A and B, in each case taking a purchase money
lien; then the borrower defaults. If the value of the goods purchased with advance
A is in excess of that advance, can the excess be applied to secure loan B; and, if so,
will the excess have the priority of a purchase money interest?
B. Future Advances
Analogous to the after-acquired property clause is a clause stating that a lien
secures all future advances. The former seeks to bring new property under the lien;
the latter seeks to include new extensions of credit within the lien. The priority
given future advances under the Code is another aspect of facilitating a "floating
charge." 9
Unless these advances are treated as if they were made contemporaneously with
the filing of the original notice, it becomes necessary for the financier to look at the
record before making the advance in order to see whether another lender has filed
a notice and made a loan which would come in ahead in regard to the collateral.
Yet it is quite possible that the future advance may have been envisaged at the time
of the initial agreement between lender and borrower; indeed, the lender may be
obligated to make the advance. Or, perhaps the advance was part of a revolving
indebtedness arrangement to keep the outstanding loan at a certain per cent of
inventory, and was made necessary by a prior, temporary reduction in the borrower's
inventory. In situations like these, the filing of a statement that the advance has
actually been made in accord with the previously filed basic loan agreement would
add little to the notice given by the original filing.
In the absence of statute, the rules covering future advances under a mortgage or
other lien seem to be rather confused.90 Apparently if the advances are obligatory
: Revision §9-313(3) (b). :I Revision §9-iio(i).
8' May 595o Draft §9-107. 'Revision §9-313(l).
90 Discussed in Waldo, Effect of Alter Acquired Liens Upon Mortgages for Future Advances, 22 FLA.
L. J. 58 (1948).
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they obtain the priority of the original recordation and do not require any subse-
quent execution of a mortgage. Of course, in the normal loan agreement where
the lender inserts a host of escape clauses, it would be difficult to tell whether a
particular advance is obligatory, for the lender, hiding behind these clauses, could
usually avoid lending if he thought it inadvisable. When the making of advances
is optional, the courts have swayed between two rules: (I) that the first lienee must
search title and see whether anyone else has filed in the interval since his original
filing; or (2) that in the absence of actual notice of a lien obtained in this interval,
the lender can make an advance with the assurance that the loan will be treated as
if made when he first recorded.
Several statutes now deal with future advances. For example, California pro-
vides that if a mortgage states a maximum for future advances, it shall be a lien as
to such amount of the same "rank, effect, status and standing" as if the money had
been loaned initially. 1 Hawaii adopts the distinction as to whether the lender was
under a duty to make the future advances: if so, the advances take the priority of
the original mortgage; if not, they create a lien only as to mortgages subsequent to
the time the advances are made." Maryland is rather harsh with future advances; 93
no mortgage to secure future advances will be given effect unless the amount of
the prospective future advances and the times when they will be made are set forth.
Moreover, the lien attaches only from the time an advance is made. The only
exception to these provisions is in cases where the advances are to be made at the
mortgagee's option and in the aggregate do not exceed $500.00. The Uniform
Chattel Mortgage Act directed itself chiefly to the problem of providing notice when
an advance had actually been made and stated that, except in the case of a revolving
indebtedness, each advance under a mortgage to secure future advances must be
evidenced on the record in order to be effective against third parties 4
The protection given future advances by the Code is not subject to any of the
restrictions provided by these statutes. But would it not have been wise to require
that a maximum for future advances be stated in the loan agreement, especially where
there is not a revolving indebtedness? Otherwise a lender, about to take second
lien, can never be sure whether subsequently a prior lienee whose statement of
financing has been filed will make new advances to the borrower-advances that
will further subordinate the second lien. Since the Code demands no particulariza-
tion, the second lender can never be sure whether the first filing refers to only a
"small potatoes" loan arrangement, or to a "big deal." Moreover, statement of a
maximum will scarcely create undue interference with a loan, for a maximum can
be set that will give plenty of margin for any contemplated advances.
While the Code provides for a statement of the termination of financing, this
statement is only required if no advances have been made under the financing state-
91CAL. CIv. CODE §2975 (194). Cf. DEL. Rnv. CoDE §3373(d) (1935).
92 Hawaii Session Laws 1939, c. 148A.
"' MD. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAws art. 66, §2 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"Sec. 19.
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ment or after the discharge of the obligation securedV5 Thus, to be entitled to such
a statement, the borrower must pay off his loan to the first financier; otherwise he
cannot get on record anything to preclude the possibility of further advances by the
first financier that will take priority under the original financing statement. Of
course, an agreement by the borrower with the second financier that he will seek no
further advances from the prior lender does no good; that lender not having joined
in the agreement, he will not be estopped from claiming priority if in fact he makes
a further advance. Perhaps in dealing with this situation the codifiers might
authorize in certain circumstances the filing of a notice, concurrent with written
notice to the lienee, stating that the borrower does not intend to request any future
advances; after this notice the original financier would have priority only as to the
aggregate indebtedness up to that time.
C. Filing and Notice
To facilitate easy security and floating charges the codifiers have very lenient
provisions for notice filing. For one thing, central filing is adopted, the lender being
required to file only at the state capital rather than in the various counties where
the goods may be locatedVO Moreover, the notice required is itself so meager as to
give little more than an indication that some sort of security transaction has been
entered into between lender and borrower. Unlike the recordation of a deed to
real estate, the filing is not designed to give detailed information to be used in show-
ing tide, but only to suggest that some assets will not be available to satisfy claims,
existing or prospective, against the debtor. Further information is to be obtained
by creditors and prospective lenders under their own steam.
A procedure provided by the Code can be utilized in getting this information.
A large creditor or prospective lender can exercise his economic leverage to compel
the debtor to submit a list of collateral to the first financier with a request that it be
approved or corrected. If "the security agreement or any other record kept by the
secured lender identifies the collateral," the first lender must comply with the re-
quest. The penalty is liability for "any losses suffered by the debtor" due to an
unreasonable failure to reply, and loss of lien as against persons "misled" by his
failure. 7  It seems the codifiers might have been wiser to eliminate entirely the
question of who was "misled." Also, perhaps a similar New Jersey law98 may be
more direct in permitting any person to demand disclosure by the financier whether
he has a lien on described chattels; after all, under the Code the debtor will usually
be submitting his list of collateral at the behest of someone else. On the other
hand, the financier might in New Jersey find he is running a costly information
service.
To supplement the vague information obtained from a filed notice of financing,
some creditors or prospective lenders may be able to get a look at the borrower's
01 Revision §9-405.
°6Revision §9-401(l)(a). Subject to some exceptions stated in Revision §9-40I(x)(b).
97 Revision §9-406. 98 N. J. R~v. STAr. §46:28-5.1 (1937).
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most recent balance sheet. Of course, the chance of seeing this balance sheet will
probably depend on the economic pressure said creditor or lender can bring to bear.
And even then, that balance sheet may be several months old and may have been
altered. Moreover, disclosure in balance sheets is not always complete; sometimes
it is difficult to ascertain from them which debts are secured and by what.
One of the chief beneficiaries of the Code might well be the credit agencies. The
minimal notice the Code requires plus the defects in alternative ways of securing
credit information may lead many creditors and lenders to lean even more heavily
than today on Dun & Bradstreet. Perhaps such enhanced importance for these
credit agencies would be only an aspect of increased specialization, but it should be
noted that in some sections of the country, there is probably less tradition of relying
on credit agencies than in others. Will these sections wish to adopt a Code under
which an individual cannot go to the courthouse and get facts on which to base a
reasonable, independent judgment whether to loan money?
For consumer sales, however, there is probably general agreement that the
Code has done well to eliminate filing of liens. 9 The cost of recordation is usually
high in proportion to the value of the security-indeed, so high that many finance
companies prefer to take the risk of not recording. Also Merchants Associations
and Better Business Bureaus funnel adequate credit information about consumers
through a semi-public agency. But it is interesting that New York in its Condi-
tional Sales Act has done an exact about-face. It requires no filing of conditional
sales for resale, but in all other sales, including consumer sales, filing must take
place.
Besides letting unsecured creditors know that certain assets are unavailable for
their claims, a filed financing statement has other functions. First, it plays an evi-
dentiary role in giving some proof that the transaction was intended from the be-
ginning to be secured, and was not an unsecured loan trumped-up into a claim of
security when the borrower is about to go broke. Even the Code's loose require-
ment of notice has value for this function.
Also some statutes seek to use public notice as a means for letting creditors know
that the debtor is seeking to create preferences, so that bankruptcy proceedings can
be instituted within four months after the transfer. For example, New Jersey
requires chattel mortgages presented for recordation to be accompanied by a detailed
affidavit of consideration which shows whether or not new value is being given.'00
Indeed, in New Jersey even when recordation of the mortgage is not required, the
affidavit of consideration must be executed. Michigan in similar fashion provides:
Every mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage of the whole or any
part of a stock of merchandise or fixtures or merchandise and fixtures, pertaining to the
conducting of any said business which shall hereafter be made for a past consideration
other than the purchase price of the property mortgaged without notice to the creditors of
"' Revision §9-3o2(d).
"IN. J. REv. STAT. §46:28-5 (x937); cf. Sec. 46: 28-5.1, construed in Bruck v. Credit Corp., 3 N. J.
401, 70 A. 2d 496 (95o).
70 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
the mortgagor as herein provided, shall be void against said creditors not so notified.10'
While many Bulk Transfer Acts are limited to bulk sales and seek chiefly to
insure that the Transferor will not sell for cash and "skip" with the proceeds, others
extend their notice requirement to bulk mortgages in order that creditors can be
tipped off to attemped preferences.' The Bulk Transfer Article of the Code has
this effect; it requires notice to creditors of any transfer "not in the ordinary course
of the transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or
other inventory of an enterprise subject to this Article or of so much thereof that
what remains together with the transferor's other assets exclusive of the considera-
tion received for the transfer, is inadequate capital for the regular conduct of his
business.' 1
03
D. Power of Sale and Right to Proceeds
In order to carry on his business, the borrower who avails himself of inventory
financing desires some right to dispose of the goods when they are ready for sale.
Yet the common law took a very dim view of a power to sell given the mortgagor
of a stock of goods. °4 In states following the New York view the mortgage was
fraudulent as a matter of law unless all proceeds resulting from the exercise of the
power of sale were applied rigorously to reducing the mortgage debt. Texas wrote
this view into its statutes providing:
Every mortgage, deed of trust, or other form of lien attempted to be given by the
owner of any stock of goods, wares or merchandise daily exposed to sale, in parcels, in the
regular course of business of such merchandise, and contemplating a continuance of the
possession of said goods by said owner, shall be deemed fraudulent and void; provided
that this Article shall not apply to farm products when offered for sale by the producer;
and further provided that this Article shall not apply to any mortgage, deed or trust or
other form of lien given to secure the purchase price of any such goods, wares or mer-
chandise, except as to all retail sales made in good faith in the regular course of business.' 03
"'MIcH. ComP. LAWS §9548 (Cum. Supp. '945).
'A table of Bulk Transfer Acts appears at page 24101 of 3 COH CONDITIONAL SALE CtrAML
MORTGAGE Ra'ORTER. See, e.g., LA. GEN. STrAT. ANN. §§9037-9045 (1939) ("The transfer in bulk and
otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular and usual prosecution of the business of
the transferor, of any portion or the whole of a stock of merchandise . . ."). The words "sale or dis-
posal" in the Kansas Bulk Sales Act were construed as including a bulk mortgage. Linn County Bank
v. Davis, 103 Kan. 672, 175 Pac. 972 (i918). But cf. Aristo Hosiery Co. v. Ramsbottom, 46 R. I.
505, r29 Ad. 503 (1925) (chattel mortgage is not a "transfer" even though Rhode Island is a "title
theory" state).
'"
5 May 195o Draft §io-io2(i).
1 oVarying treatments of the power of sale and the duty of accounting thereunder are set forth
in Note, 28 ORE. L. REv. 376 (5949)-
'°'TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4000 (Supp. 1950). Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. §51-5o6 (Supp. 1949)
(Right to sell or exchange "if the proceeds of such sale or exchange are applied upon the mortgage debt or
subjected to the lien of said mortgage, or are used solely for the purpose of paying the expenses of culti-
vating, harvesting, preparing for market, processing, marketing or otherwise preserving or rendering
merchantable or salable the remaining property covered by said mortgage . . ."); MAINE REV. STAT.
c. 164, §§2, 8 (944) (A power of sales does not affect the validity of the mortgage but "no consent
given by the mortgagee of personal property to the mortgagor for the sale or exchange of the mortgaged
personal property shall be valid or be used in evidence in civil process unless in writing and signed by
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Apparently under this statute the very existence of the power of sale, irrespective of
any accounting required of the mortgagor, voids the lien. Some states follow Texas
in relaxing the restrictions on a mortgage of inventory if the mortgage is for the
purchase price of the goods; others permit the mortgagor, in accounting for proceeds,
to deduct expenses necessary to the immediate sale-which of course does not
include overhead-or a sum necessary for the replenishment of inventory.
One way to rationalize the New York requirement of accounting is on the theory
that the accounting for proceeds of sale attests the good faith of the mortgage.
Without this requirement a mortgage to some friend or relative could be put on
record to stave off creditors, and yet the "mortgagor" would be in the same position
as before, being able to use the proceeds in whatever way he wished. The accounting
for proceeds helps show the transaction was not a sham. Of course, where the mort-
gage is for the purchase price the demonstration of good faith by accounting is super-
fluous and can be dispensed with.
However, the feeling has spread that sham transactions and preferences can be
better eliminated by Bulk Transfer Acts than by continuing the requirement of
accounting for proceeds. The requirement is felt to be especially harsh in that a
lender who fails to police the proceeds loses not only his lien on those proceeds but
also a lien on any of the original collateral that has not been disposed of. Moreover,
procedures for accounting often have turned into a lot of hocus-pocus that run up
expenses without producing any appreciable benefit. For example, under one ar-
rangement for "accounting," if a bank is the financier, proceeds are deposited in a
special account to the bank's credit; contemporaneously with each deposit a check
on the special account is drawn in favor of the borrower and deposited in his per-
sonal account' 0 Another set up involves deposits in a special account from which
withdrawals are made if the bank's agent countersigns the withdrawal request; this
procedure resisted attack in one case even though the agent apparently countersigned
habitually and rather automatically.107  Almost the only ones who benefit from
"accounting" in this form are banks; they receive a financing edge over other
lenders, since they have better facilities for entering these evasive arrangements.
Perhaps the chief objection to the requirement of accounting by the borrower
derives from its having been carried to absurd lengths in the cases following Bene-
dict v. Ratner.0 s Some courts have felt the requirement negated any permission
for a borrower with a power of sale to make any adjustments with his customers,
however desirable commercially. For example, he could not be allowed to accept
returns of goods, else the lien would fall.
the mortgagee or his assigns"). Cf. N. M. STAT. ANN. §63-514 (1941); N. H. REv. LAws c. 262, §19
(1942); WIs. STAT. §241-14 (1947), prescribing so many formalities that in [1947J Wis. L. REv. 453
it is pointed out the statute is almost useless and should either be eliminated or greatly relaxed.
"06 Monumental Shoe Mfg. Co., 14 F. 2d 549 (D. Md. 1926).
"' Ford v. C. E. Wilson & Co., 529 F. 2d 614 (2d Cir. 1942). Note, 24 N. Y. U. L. REV. 598
(1949), describes various arrangements for circumventing "accounting" requirements.
108 268 U. S. 353 (1925).
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The arguments against accounting have produced steady statutory sniping. For
instance the Uniform Trust Receipts Act takes the view that complete loss of lien
is too severe a penalty for failure to "police" the borrower; it provides merely that if,
during the ten days after the entruster obtains knowledge of proceeds, there is no
demand for accounting, his lien on those proceeds is waived.10 9 Presumably the
knowledge that the borrower-trustee has power to sell or is selling the goods in
regular course would imply a knowledge that proceeds of some sort are being
created. And so in most instances the Act would seem to afford nothing more than
a ten day period of grace in which to go after proceeds or lose all claim thereto.
Incidentally, since trust receipts are confined chiefly to enabling advances, for pur-
poses of "accounting" they would come within the same policy exception as mort-
gages for the purchase price.
New York in passing its Factor's Lien Law relaxed the rigid rule that a borrow-
er could not accept returns or grant credit, allowances, or adjustments to pur-
chasers 10 The Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act went even further towards re-
moving the requirement that the lender police. After stating that the mortgage is
not invalid because there is no duty to account for proceeds, the Act provides: "there
shall be a presumption against any provision for accounting for the proceeds of
any disposition of the subject matter.' 1 Wyoming seems to adopt the contrary
presumption with its provision that while it shall be lawful for a mortgagor to sell
without accounting, "unless permission is expressly given otherwise in the mortgage,
the mortgagor shall pay over to the mortgagee all moneys received from the sale of
any part of the mortgaged property aforesaid."""
The Code follows the trend of these statutes lessening the rigors of accounting.
It abolishes any presumption of fraud by reason of the borrower's power to make
adjustments or accept m returns. Not until the September Revision, however, did
the codifiers say explicitly whether returned goods are proceeds or merely the
original collateral." 4 The Code gives a ten day period of grace during which a
perfected lien follows "proceeds," in this respect accepting the policy of the Trust
Receipts Act but removing the qualification therein as to knowledge of proceeds. 15
Such a qualification only adds a litigable issue and tends to reward a lender who
fails to keep track of his collateral. Most important, the Code permits indefinite
extension of the lien on proceeds if there is included in the original notice of
financing a statement that the lien covers proceeds."" The chief deterrent to in-
clusion of such a statement would be that it automatically creates a power of sale in
the borrower. 17 Yet, as to inventory, a limitation on the borrower's power of sale is
109 Sec. IO(c).
"°N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAw §45.
1 Sec. I8.
'~' Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. §59-114 (1945).
... Revision §9-207.
... Revision §9-3o6(4). Bloch v. Mill Factors Corporation, aii F. 2d 536 (2d Cir. I94).
... Revision §9.3o6(i).
... Revision §9-3o6(i) (a).
"" Revision §9-307(2).
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of little value anyway, since even knowledge thereof does not lessen the ability of a
buyer in ordinary course to cut off the security interest. l s
In the provisions concerning the automatic lien on proceeds the codifiers seem to
be seeking a compromise which will promote whatever policing of collateral is
especially desirable socially but will not require expensive formalities. Cash repre-
sents the ultimate in liquidity. If cash proceeds are allowed to accumulate in the
borrower's hands, his creditors may be deceived as to his condition. Moreover, the
borrower may yield to the temptation to take a protracted trip to Mexico with these
cash proceeds. The Code's provision giving a lien on cash proceeds only for the
ten days preceding insolvency-though it was probably directed chiefly towards
eliminating litigation about "tracing"-has the desirable result of prodding the
lender to police cash. Accounts receivable are also liquid; but the notice given by
the borrower's original financing statement claiming a lien on proceeds serves to
destroy their liquidity. Thus, the dangers of misleading creditors and of fraud
on the lender are taken care of by the requirement of the initial notice. It would
be unduly formalistic to follow some factor's lien statutes in demanding that the
financier obtain periodic assignments of accounts arising from the sale of liened
goods." 9 Chattel paper involves an intermediate situation. Obviously it does not
have the liquidity of cash. But the "thrust" of the Code is towards making chattel
paper very similar to negotiable instruments, accentuating possession and eliminating
any need for an assignee to search records for a prior interest in the paper. Ac-
cordingly, though the inventory lien covers chattel paper arising from the sale
thereof, the Code furnishes a pressure for the lender to police; otherwise his interest
may be cut off by a subsequent assignee of the chattel paper-even one who knows
that there is a security interest in inventory and that this interest extends to the
proceeds of the inventory' 20  The only way for the financier to protect his lien
is either to obtain possession of the chattel paper or have noted on the paper the
existence of his interest.
A strong objection can be taken that the automatic lien on accounts provided by
the Code (very much like the protection given the secured lender as to after-acquired
property and future advances) tends to tie the borrower to a single financier. Even
if the inventory lien covers only a small amount of inventory it will be difficult, to
an extent depending on the manner in which the borrower keeps his books, to tell
whether the accounts about to be assigned derive from the sale of such inventory
and are therefore subject to the lien. The prospective financier against receivables
may well be uncertain of the value of his collateral when he sees an iiventory
financier's notice purporting to cover all the proceeds. Consequently if the borrower
needs extra cash because of an emergency, he may have to get it from the original
inventory financier or not at all. This poses two difficulties. The first lender, having
the borrower over a barrel, may extort a high financing fee; or the lender may be
" Revision §9-307(1).
.
1 N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAw §45 seems to require these assignments unless the account debtor is notified.
.2. Revision §9-308(2).
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an institution which does not engage in receivables financing. If the latter is the
case, probably the borrower's accounts existing at the time of the initial loan were
not relied on by the financier as security. And now the borrower can get no money
against the accounts which replaced those earlier receivables. The consequence is his
receivables have brought him no cash.
Perhaps this whole problem is unrealistic. Not too much multiple financing
goes on, there usually being established a rapport between a businessman and some
particular financing institution. Moreover, many lenders finance the inventory
chiefly as a basis for getting the borrower's receivables financing on which higher
profits are to be made. This seems especially true in the durable goods industries
where inventory is financed under "floor plans" at exceedingly low rates in order
that the lender can get a chance to handle the high profit consumer paper. These
financing facts of life persuade me to defer to the judgment of the codifiers in per-
mitting an automatic lien on proceeds.
IV
CONCLUSION
If enacted, the proposed Commercial Code will revolutionize the law of security.
The certainty and the simplicity it affords are indeed desirable ends. As to its
liberalization of security, the nature and the desirability of the results seem inde-
terminate. I will only try to suggest some of the possible consequences for our
economy.
Presumably the availability of easy security, the better protection afforded the
secured financier, will enable him to offer credit more freely and on better terms,
and to take as collateral things which before were unacceptable. With more credit
accessible demands for goods might be heightened among merchants whose ex-
pansion is now thwarted by the difficulty of securing funds. A precedent is afforded
in the history of the automobile industry. There manufacturers required cash for
their goods, but many dealers had no cash. Yet the dealers needed large inventories
in order properly to display and sell the goods. The development of the trust receipt
helped provide an escape from this empasse for it afforded an easy security device
for financing autos while they were in transit from manufacturer to dealer, and
subsequently while they were in the dealer's show room. The trust receipt was
the corner-stone for "floor planning," which, in turn, stoked large-scale automobile
distribution, the necessary auxiliary to mass production.
The availability of easy security may also aid in halting the increasing trend to-
wards concentration in production and distribution. An entrepreneur can get money
in two ways: by equity financing or by loans. For small concerns the cost of the
former is prohibitive since the proportionate cost of floating the issue varies inversely
with the size of the issue. 1 Moreover, in placing a stock issue the "little fellow" will
usually not possess the advantageous contacts with investment bankers afforded the
... See Adelman, Integration and the Antitrust Laws, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 27, 33 (1949).
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"big boys" through interlocking directorates and social connections. As for loans,
small firms must rely on secured financing. The Code, by tending to reduce the
cost of secured financing and by making it feasible for financiers to loan against
broader categories of collateral, opens up new vistas of financing for small concerns,
and thus reduces the pressure on them to go out of business or be merged with large
outfits.
After careful examination of the Code, the fundamental question in my mind is
this: If it is so easy to be a secured creditor and the rights of the secured creditor are
so strong, who is going to be an unsecured creditor? Today they are the sellers.
Yet the few formalities required under the Code will induce most sellers to obtain
purchase-money security interests. Many small creditors will be sheltered by ma-
terialmen's liens. Consequently the easy security of the Code and especially the right
to after-acquired property and to proceeds may not avail financing institutions as
much as some believe, for under the Code many will take a lien for whom today it
represents too much trouble and expense.
Cash sales may well become more common under the Code.' 22 Because of the
probability that the buyer's assets will be encumbered by secured liens, the amount
of which will be difficult to detect, many sellers now selling on open credit will feel
it is too dangerous to continue doing so. Some, instead of taking a purchase-money
lien, may decide to sell only for cash. Also, a pressure towards cash sales may
develop from the other side; many a buyer will seek to obtain a loan against in-
coming inventory in order to take up the cash discount offered by sellers. The effect
of these developments would be the destruction of receivables financing except for
the financing of consumer sales, in which chattel paper is normally taken.
If this pattern of cash sales evolves under which the purchase will be financed
by a loan to the borrower from some professional lending institution instead of on
credit extended by the seller, greater specialization will result--credit being concen-
trated in the hands of professional financiers. Yet would these institutions be able
to evaluate as well as the seller the conditions in the buyer's industry, which de-
termine the value of the collateral and to large degree the prospect of the buyer's
insolvency? Of course the centralization of credit in lending institutions would
make the economy more subject to governmental regulation. And perhaps it would
give a more conservative cast to the economy, the conservatism of bankers being
famous.
Broad imponderables like these require the combined wisdom of lawyers, econo-
mists, and political scientists. In a realm more closely associated with law, it can be
confidently asserted that as a legislative endeavor the Code's Article on Secured Trans-
actions is excellent. In draftsmanship it is, like the well-known soap, 99.44 per cent
pure; and, even if not adopted in toto, the Code, with its consistent and well-articu-
lated goals, should be a model for any state desiring to bring order out of the chaos
in its law of secured financing.
12' Cf. Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Financing, 62 HARv. L. RE v. 588, 613-15 (1949).
